According to the race report published last year, 63% of Black caribbean households are single parent households, as opposed to the black african community who is at 43%, the UK’s rate is 14.7%. The culture for the black community in the UK is quite similar to the US which also has problems with black on black crime, low literacy rates and father absence. The larger question that has raged between left and right for centuries is nature or nurture? How much control does an ethnic minority have over their fate?
What we are discussing is not an issue exclusive to the black community. “Redneck culture” , a term used by Thomas Sowell to describe a subculture prevalent in ghettos, encourages a way of life and mentality that is not conducive to the success of any community. A quote from his book White Liberals and Black Rednecks used to describe the southern white population follows: “ proneness to violence, neglect of education, sexual promiscuity… reckless searches for excitement, lively music and dance etc” This is only a short sample from a long list of cultural behaviours that without knowing the topic of focus, would be thought exclusive to the black community.
What the leftist intelligentsia often leave out of conversations about race are the effects of culture and values within a community. Not every ill can be attributed to the supposed “effects of capitalism”. The left’s obsession with proving that racism causes inequality has meant that many problems that could be solved independent of the state, are used as incentives to garner the black vote.
With the data available by comparing the different ethnic communities in the UK we should be able to see the effect that values have on a community, which largely shows that the Black African community does much better in education and has lower rates of expulsion for pupils alongside better mental health. This is especially outstanding as the things mentioned above are named as social behavioral problems, arising from single parenthood. As the lack of a paternal and/or maternal influence are proven to negatively affect emotional control for example higher levels of aggression. Could this be why Caribbean pupils are twice as likely to get temporarily excluded at 10.2% compared to 4.2%. They also have the highest rates of detention under the mental health act.
The black community in Britain faces a large issue of knife crime where between 2017 and 2020 black people aged 15-17 made up 47% of homicide victims. Sadiq Khan even predicts a rise in violent crime in London due to the cost of living crisis.
Aside from behavioral problems, Caribbean pupils are also far more likely than African students to do worse in education. Which should be the top priority for growth in any community as it leads to higher paid jobs. Although black pupils as a whole are more likely to go to university than white pupils. Black Caribbean students are the most likely to go into high tariff universities. Could this possibly be because there is a lack of educational importance in the Caribbean community, which means that African pupils progress further? 10.9% of black caribbean compared to 17.3% of African pupils gain 3 A’s at A Level.
Now immigrants do tend to do better in education, but not all immigrants do equally well. 42% of the Chinese population gained 3 A’s and 33.2% of Indians followed by 26% of white students. Which indicates that their fate is not fixed but contrary, and that immigrant children often outperform white students.
What the black community has is not primarily an issue of race but of culture, which requires steady homes and values to fix, that which conservatism provides.
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Putin’s War: A Tale of Soviet Romanticism and Western Ignorance | Daniel Hawker
With Russian troops having begun a full-scale invasion of neighbouring Ukraine, President Joe Biden was recently asked by a journalist “Do you think you may have underestimated Putin?” In response to the question, the supposed ‘most powerful man in the world’ offered merely a smirk and proceeded to sit in silence whilst his team rushed to stop the video recording. This was inevitably due to the honest answer being yes – the warning signs have been evident for decades. Let us first consider the historical basis for the invasion.
Vladimir Putin’s position as a Soviet romantic has come to be a defining aspect of his political image. In his 2005 state of the nation address, he notably referred to the 1991 collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”, an event which left “tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen … beyond the fringes of Russian territory”. It is this Slavophilic perspective that is paramount in understanding the motives and aims of Russian foreign policy in Eastern Europe. With the fall of the USSR came, according to Russian nationalists, the mass displacement of Soviet citizens outside of the Motherland. Millions of Slavic people, all of whom shared a rich cultural history, now living within the borders of independent states, stripped of their collective identity. At this time, young Vladimir Putin was working for the Mayor of Leningrad, and this moment came to shape his ideology and vision for Russia’s future (and the future of former-Soviet satellite states).
Ukraine however, has always occupied a special place within Russian romantic nationalism. The Russian Federation actually has its origins in modern-day Ukraine – specifically the Kievan Rus’ federation (consisting of East Slavic, Baltic and Finnic peoples), which existed from the 9th to the 13th century. Linguistic and cultural roots remain strong, with most Ukrainians also speaking Russian, especially in the eastern and southern parts of the country. Whilst a region of the Russian Empire (and later the USSR), Ukraine was a crucial region for agriculture due to its soil, which is exceptionally well-suited to the farming of crops.
Given this intertwined history, a key tenant of Putin’s romantic mindset is the idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, and must therefore exist within the same state. This view was most recently revealed in a 2021 article written by the president, titled ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’, in which he affirmed that “true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia”. Stella Ghervas, a professor of Russian history at Newcastle University, has explained that “the borders of the Russian Empire in 1914 remain a point of reference from the Kremlin up to this day”.
However, it seems that the West has chosen not only to ignore how ideologically desperate Putin is to reclaim Ukraine, but also how brutally willing he has been to utilise hard power to achieve his expansionist aims. 2008 saw artillery attacks by pro-Russian separatists (backed by Putin) in the South Ossetia region of Georgia; 2014 brought us the infamous annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and 2021 saw a mass-movement of Russian troops and military equipment to the Ukrainian border, raising concerns over a potential invasion. These examples should have clearly demonstrated to Western powers the lack of respect Vladimir Putin has for national sovereignty, and that once his mind becomes fixated on regaining lost Soviet territory, he can’t be easily dissuaded. With this in mind, the invasion of Ukraine should be viewed as the inevitable and long-awaited finale to Putin’s expansionist concerto.
The response to the latest developments is hardly surprising: economic sanctions appear to be a firm favourite amongst Western leaders; Boris Johnson has sanctioned five Kremlin-friendly oligarchs and aims to target “all the major manufacturers that support Putin’s war machine”, whilst Joe Biden has levied penalties against major Russian industries and frozen the bank assets of the regime’s major figures. An international effort has also been undertaken, with the UK, US, EU and Canada agreeing to cut off a number of Russian banks from SWIFT, the international payment system. However, such sanctions, especially those against individuals, have received pushback. Following Crimea in 2014, the late and greatly-missed philosopher Sir Roger Scruton published a piece in which laid out how believing that sanctions against oligarchs “will make the faintest difference to Russia’s expansionist foreign policy is an illusion of staggering naivety” – having faced the threat of increased sanctions since then, Russia has built up foreign currency reserves of $630bn (akin to ⅓ of their economy).
In terms of military responses, the general consensus is that Western troops won’t be deployed, and there is a simple logic to it – Western populations have no real hankering for a war: two recent YouGov polls revealed 55% of Britons and 55% of Americans oppose sending their own troops to fight in Ukraine (for the United States, last year’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan undoubtedly turned the public off of war for a while). However, NATO troops have been deployed to Eastern Europe, and we’ve also sent 1,000 soldiers to Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Poland, in preparation for the inevitable outpouring of innocent and scared Ukrainian families.
Whilst the objectives of the Putin regime and the long-term naivety of the Western order are the two primary factors, the West’s role in bringing this situation about must also be acknowledged, for the sake of honest discussion. In the early 1990s, Boris Yeltsin expressed his desire for Russia to one day join NATO; Putin echoed this in 2000 when Bill Clinton visited Moscow. Despite Russia at these times being a fledgling democracy, they were turned down by the alliance – provided the opportunity to start anew and help the Russian people, the West refused to bring Russia into the international fold.
Further evidence of the West’s culpability is the expansion of NATO’s borders. Although an arrangement with murky origins, the generally-understood version is that the US Secretary of State James Baker, told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO expansion was ‘not on the agenda’. Regardless, the welcoming of former Eastern Bloc states into the alliance (Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, and Albania and Croatia in 2009) has only served to worsen relations between Putin and the West – despite the availability of open dialogue for decades, we’ve consistently chosen mistrust when dealing with Russia.
Whilst the West may be shocked that Putin actually went ahead with a military invasion, it can’t seriously claim to have been surprised; the president’s intentions regarding Eastern Europe and Ukraine especially have been nefariously evident for at least a decade, in which time we’ve fooled ourselves, downplaying the risk Russia posed. We must endeavour to remember however, the most tragic consequences of this entire situation: the many thousands of innocent Ukrainian civilians who’ve lost their lives, their homes and their feeling of safety within their own borders. For Russia, sanctions will hurt their citizens, all whilst their understanding of the situation is distorted through propagandistic state media. This really is a horrific situation, and one that has occurred because of Putin’s worldview and Western leaders’ inability to take Russia seriously as a threat.
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The Hidden Costs of Exporting CO2 Emissions
Introduction
As the world grapples with the urgent need to combat climate change, discussions surrounding CO2 emissions and their impact on the global economy has taken centre stage. One contentious issue that has emerged is the concept of CO2 import tariffs. Such tariffs would aim to address the soaring demand of exporting carbon emissions to countries like China and India while seemingly reducing emissions domestically. However, I will proceed to argue that this approach harms the British economy and businesses alike, creating an illusion of progression in a desperate ploy for Western nations to ‘feed their image‘ on the global stage, this issue has also exacerbated the case to accelerate the implementation of CO2 import tariffs – levelling the playing field for sustainable, British industrial goods.
The Mirage of Reduced Emissions
The introduction of CO2 import tariffs, scheduled for 2026, is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, however, there is a growing consensus that these tariffs should be implemented sooner rather than later, with more stringent fees. The primary reason for this urgency is the alarming trend of British businesses struggling to compete with offshore prices, due to their minimal to no CO2 regulations in countries like China and India.
Statistics will tell the same story: Over the past decade, European nations have made significant strides in reducing their CO2 emissions. For instance, the European Union’s emissions fell by 24% between 1990 and 2019. However, as a result of these reductions, imports from Asian nations, particularly China, have surged. In 2019, the UK alone imported goods worth £49.5 billion from China, a significant portion of which was produced in industries with higher CO2 emissions. This shift in emissions from the West to the East raises critical questions about the effectiveness of domestic emission reduction efforts.
Yes, it is obvious Western nations have made a conscious effort to drastically manage C02 emissions, however it cannot be denied that this effort has a little to no effect on global emission rates. Since 2005 for the US and 1990 for Europe, CO2 emissions have operated at a downward tangent, however at the same time both China and India have increased their emissions year on year – with no reduction.
Levelling the Playing Field
The argument in favour of accelerating CO2 import tariffs rests on the premise of creating a level playing field for sustainable goods. British companies that have had to adhere to stringent environmental regulations have faced a significant competitive disadvantage when competing against products manufactured in countries with laxed emission expectations. This not only harms domestic businesses, but also undermines the goals of reducing global emissions, thus the only identifiable solution would be to either reduce our own emission regulations, or introduce a boarder tariff, pinpointed at nations with subnormal CO2 rates.
Through imposing these higher import tariffs on goods produced in extreme CO2-emitting countries, the UK can incentivize foreign manufacturers to adopt cleaner manufacturing practices, actively reducing global emission rates – rather than feeding our emissions elsewhere. Such tariffs would reflect the true environmental cost of the imported goods, reducing the price advantage enjoyed by high-emission industries abroad. This, in turn, would encourage British consumers to choose more sustainable options, fostering a transition towards cleaner and greener products. But that isn’t the only benefit! As a result, one would expect us to become more self-sufficient, and as a nation be less reliant overseas and more focused on our own industrial goods.
Addressing Arguments Against CO2 Import Tariffs
Some argue that Western nations have enjoyed an unfair advantage for centuries and that it is now their responsibility to bear the economic costs of climate change. While historical inequalities can indeed be argued, I would contend that any attempts to do so would be in vain, combined with a lack of understanding that if tomorrow we relaxed all of our climate regulations (which is a lot), then our economic situation would soar higher – deceitfully so – than fellow European nations.
Picture a scenario where the UK could potentially usher in a wave of economic benefits – via little to no climate regulations. Industries seeking lower production costs might see the UK as a more attractive destination, enhancing our global competitiveness. Sectors with high energy consumption, like manufacturing and heavy industry, would find it financially advantageous to operate in a less regulated environment, resulting in greater job creation. Does that sound familiar? Because this is precisely how China and co have operated over the last 20 years, summarizing why their economy has taken such a colossal leap.
Arguing that because of historical inequalities we should just expect Western nations to continue to lose business and incur high costs for the sake of climate change, and only to see reduced emissions move elsewhere, simply ignores the interconnectedness of our global economy. The environmental damage caused by unchecked emissions in one part of the world ultimately affects us all. By exporting emissions to countries with fewer regulations, we are merely shifting the problem, not solving it. If global emissions continue to rise, while our own emissions head towards net zero, it begs the question: what is the point in all of this? Why persist in regulating our businesses to the brink of collapse, relinquishing our capacity to sustain our domestic market, and fostering an import-dependent culture, all while our endeavours seem to yield no significant results?
Conclusion
To conclude, it is undeniable that CO2 import tariffs represent a crucial tool in addressing the harmful practice of exporting emissions to countries with non-existent regulations. While there is a similar scheme set to be introduced in 2026, there is a compelling case for their acceleration and strengthening of this. The fact of the matter is that European nations’ reduction in CO2 emissions has only led to a surge in imports from high-emitting countries, highlighting the need for immediate action and showcasing to other nations that the only way to grow their economy is to mass produce (with high CO2 costs) for the sake of us Western nations to ‘look good on the global stage’.
These tariffs are not about punishing other nations, but rather about creating a level playing field for sustainable and British goods. They will encourage cleaner production practices globally and drive the transition to a more sustainable and equitable global economy.
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Now more than ever, Farage must discern between converts and infiltrators
The recent defections of Nadhim Zahawi, Robert Jenrick, and Suella Braverman from the Tories to Reform have caused quite a stir – among both supporters and opponents – yet seemingly for the wrong reasons.
In theory, a political start-up winning the endorsement of a former Chancellor sounds like great news. It certainly looks good on paper. The support of a former high-ranking official potentially brings much-needed insider knowledge and some personal clout to the table.
Unfortunately, this endorsement isn’t just good on paper – it’s only good on paper. Despite it being his defining credential, Nadhim Zahawi was Chancellor for barely two months before being shuffled away under Liz Truss – probably for the best, all things considered.
Nothing of note was achieved during his brief internship at the Treasury. Zahawi’s tenure reminds us of a period of politics rather than any policy – specifically, the end of the last Conservative government; the unpopularity of which continues to contaminate the party’s standing with the public years later.
If Zahawi is known for anything of substance, it’s for being Vaccines minister; at best, some may recall him as a vaguely competent manager of the rollout, while others regard him as a sinister bio-authoritarian technocrat – most notably, the Reform voters who kept the party afloat during Lockdown, when it was jostling for third place with the Liberal Democrats.
Of course, he wasn’t just any Tory MP. Zahawi was among the core Cameron-era intake. When his defection was announced, commentators were quick to note his socially liberal positions, from his support for immigration – including mass amnesty for illegals – to his past support for progressive mainstays like DEI and BLM.
Moreover, his past attacks on Nigel Farage – such as comparing the Reform leader to Joseph Goebbels – and accusations of an unsuccessful bid for a Tory peerage a few months prior have all understandably created trouble for the supposed convert.
This all might sound a bit harsh. People do have Damascene conversions. However, Zahawi’s track record shows that authenticity is really not his strongest point. The day after his promotion to Chancellor under Boris Johnson – at the height of Partygate, no less – Zahawi publicly called for Johnson’s resignation. Only 48 hours earlier, he had agreed to serve in his government!
When Boris finally resigned, and Truss inevitably crashed and burned, Zahawi called for Johnson’s return to power – that is, only after support for his own leadership bid failed to materialise. Over the course of a month, Zahawi went from Boris loyalist to anti-Boris conspirator to Boris restorationist, and while people took wry enjoyment in his shamelessly serpentine manoeuvres at the time, it begs a question of loyalty now that he’s defected to Reform.
By contrast, Jenrick has been received more warmly by Reformers, although it’s hardly a match made in Heaven. Like Zahawi, he wasn’t just some Tory apparatchik. Jenrick won his Newark seat in a 2014 by-election at a time when UKIP was on-the-up and the Conservatives were under siege. Earlier in the year, UKIP beat the Tories to second place in the Wythenshawe and Sale East by-election. Later in the year, it would gain seats in the Commons following by-election victories in Clacton and Rochester.
As such, Jenrick’s election to Parliament was about more than filling space on the green benches; it was explicitly about refuting the idea that the Conservatives needed to move rightward on immigration, EU membership, political correctness, etc. – taking the form of strategic ignorance than anything overtly ideological. People don’t really want less immigration, so you can afford to ignore it; just marginally improve their living standards and they’ll stop voting for populists. Sound familiar?
A triumph for full-fat Cameronism over UKIP-lite, Jenrick was hailed by the kind of progressive interlopers who now view him as the second coming of Hermann Göring. Thereafter, Jenrick was identified with the centrist wing of the party. What little he did say about immigration was vague but ultimately liberal, and that was pretty much of the end of things until a few years ago.
The official narrative around Jenrick’s conversion is that his time at the Home Office was so gruelling that it pushed him rightward. This is certainly plausible. Jenrick’s tenure was mostly defined by low-grade cost-cutting measures and monitoring the situation. His most hardline decision was arguably the removal of a Mickey Mouse mural in a migrant detention centre. Such a record just as much indicates a Home Office strangling more ambitious proposals as a minister being insufficiently opposed to migration, so it’s hardly a slam-dunk example of ideological inauthenticity.
Nevertheless, Jenrick’s conversion was impeccably well-timed and rather recent. Dropped as Housing Secretary, Jenrick was appointed as Minister for Immigration in 2022 by then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak because he wasn’t particularly right-wing; allegedly, Sunak intended Jenrick to act as a counterweight to then Home Secretary Suella Braverman… who has also defected to Reform!
Out of the Tory Trio that have defected this month, Braverman’s is perhaps the easiest and toughest to square. Her credentials are far stronger than Jenrick’s and much stronger than Zahawi’s. The European Research Group’s former chairman does seem to have genuine socially conservative convictions, and is something of a ‘Deepa Kaur‘-esque figure of both hatred and ridicule for progressives.
Many will inevitably point to her track record as Home Secretary – and specifically, her inability to get the migration numbers down and presiding over the Afghan cover-up – but this (much like Jenrick’s record as immigration minister) is a question of authenticity rather than efficacy. matters, and Braverman needs to be criticised for this before being given any portfolio of any kind, but is not the central focus here. The point being is that she can’t be faulted on rhetoric; a vice in other contexts but technically a virtue here.
Her undeniable “uselessness” as Home Secretary aside, and resolve most likely born from conviction, it’s believable that she feels at home in Reform. The fact she didn’t run in the 2024 Conservative leadership race suggests sincere alienation from her former party, and the fact that pretty much everyone saw this coming down the pipe, are surely worth something even to sceptics.
Critics will continue to use the fact these people were Conservative MPs against them – including the Conservative Party itself, it seems – but this isn’t really the issue. Danny Kruger was a Tory MP, and everyone sees him as a major asset to Reform, and rightfully so; even Dominic Cummings had nice things to say about him, and he scarcely says nice things about anyone.
Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless, winners of the by-elections in Clacton and Rochester, were Tory defectors. Much of UKIP’s presence in the European Parliament was comprised of former Conservative MEPs alienated by the party’s embrace of Europhilia, including Roger Helmer – former Conservative MEP for the East Midlands and Jenrick’s rival in the Newark by-election of 2014.
If not assets, other former Tories have proven inoffensive enough. Lee Anderson has long since shaken his association with his old party – indeed, he’s done it once before. Jake Berry was obscure enough to get away with defecting. Nadine Dorries – arguably the worst defection thus far, courtesy her contribution to Online Safety Act – is made tolerable only by the likelihood that she won’t have any real power.
The simple fact of the matter is that Reform was always bound to take some Tory flotsam on board. When your modus operandi for the next decade is to supplant and replace the Tories as the main right-leaning party in Britain, it’s pretty much a given.
Rather, the problem is the reliability of Reform’s converts. To have lived a life of sin is less problematic than never converting at all; this is true of religion and it is true of politics. Farage is headed for the belly of the beast; the antibodies of the regime are going to be working overtime to make his time in Number 10 as unfruitful and frustrating as possible. If the Blob is resistant to Keir Starmer, of all people, it’s sure to have an existential hatred of Mr Brexit. The next election is scheduled for 2029, and we’re already hearing murmurs from Whitehall about how to stop Reform from within.
Now more than ever, Farage needs true believers around him, and while Brexit Braverman’s defection is intuitive, I doubt he’ll be able to rely on “The Boy from Baghdad” when he inevitably comes under fire.
The jury’s still out on Bobby J.
As we’ve seen in the United States – especially during the first Trump administration, but increasingly during the second – the recycling of staffers, advisers, and appointees can destabilise and inhibit the leader from the next layer down. Given that Reform’s success verifiably hinges on Farage’s personal capital, meaning Reform’s success in Whitehall will hinge upon Farage’s personal ability to Do Things.
One might say this is true of all governments, not merely those controlled by populists, and while this is true, it’s especially true of one plausibly (not merely technically) campaigning on the expectation of real, fundamental change; change that, at times, may wholly necessary but still deeply unpopular. The failure to match voter expectations is politics as usual, but Reform is promising exactly the opposite. Failure to translate executive will into tangible results will not only be used as ammunition by rival parties, but by the establishment (from all parties and none) and reactionaries desperately seeking to retrench it.
